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AMENDING THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS OR CLOSING OFF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY?
Kevin R. Carter'
Differences in the ability of classes to use the machinery of the law, if
permitted to remain, lead inevitably to disparity between the rights of
classes in the law itself. And when the law recognizes and enforces a dis-
tinction between classes, revolution ensues and democracy is at an end.
Reginald Heber Smith, Justice and the Poor, 1919
1. INTRODUCTION
In November 2005, four anonymous plaintiffs sued the automobile
tire maker Firestone and its parent companies, Bridgestone Corporation and
Bridgestone Americas Holdings, Inc., in a California court. None of the
plaintiffs drove on defective tires or probably ever drove a car at all. Their
lawsuit alleged offenses more sinister and deliberate than negligent manu-
facture-the transgression that led to a mandatory product recall and cloud
of legal controversy for Firestone earlier this decade.
Instead the plaintiffs were all workers on an eighty-year old Fire-
stone rubber plantation in Liberia. They each sought damages for forced
labor, child labor, cruel and degrading treatment, negligent supervision, and
unjust enrichment. As their complaint vividly explained, they were "trapped
by poverty and coercion on a frozen-in-time Plantation operated ... in a
manner identical to [that] when it was first opened [in 1926].... [T]he Fire-
stone Plantation remains a gulag of misery ... [where] most of the workers
have never been off the plantation and do not even know that .. slavery
has been abolished."1
Lawyers from the International Labor Rights Fund, an organization
promoting fair wages and working conditions in workplaces around the
world, represent the plaintiffs in the ongoing lawsuit. They allege that Fire-
stone's workers spend twelve to fourteen hour shifts tapping latex from rub-
ber trees for around three U.S. dollars a day.2 "Tappers," with the com-
pany's approval, enlist their school-age children to help meet the planta-
* Case Western Reserve University, J.D. candidate (2007). The author thanks Alex
McClean for his frequent helpful advice.
1 Complaint at 1-2, Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., et al., (C.D.CA, 2005)(No. 05-8168) [here-
inafter Firestone Complaint].
2 Id. at21.
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tion's unreasonably high quotas.3 Adults and children alike are exposed
repeatedly to deadly pesticides and raw latex, which can cause blindness.4
Schools and a hospital Firestone once built for workers' families are badly
decayed.5 For shelter, more than a dozen people crowd into small mud huts
without electricity or running water while American and Japanese supervi-
sors look on from luxurious homes on bluffs above the rubber forest.6
Since the plantation's workforce comes exclusively from Africa, the
plaintiffs are connected to the United States only though their largely absent
employer.7 How can the arm of American law reach a one million-acre rub-
ber plantation half a world away from its owners? American labor laws
generally do not apply outside the boundaries of the fifty states.8 In spite of
this-or perhaps because of it-American companies have built hundreds of
foreign manufacturing facilities employing tens of thousands of workers
over the last twenty years-many of them in developing nations.
The plaintiffs therefore cannot rely on traditional domestic remedies
provided by laws like the Civil Rights and Fair Labor Standards Acts. Nor
do Liberian courts offer any prospects for relief.9 But because some of Fire-
stone's alleged offenses may rise to the level of human rights violations, the
plaintiffs have recourse through a long-forgotten federal law called the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). ° Around 1980, foreign plaintiffs started
using the ATCA to recover civil damages for human rights violations in
U.S. courts when "non-functioning judiciaries" made winning local lawsuits
impossible.
3 Mensiegar Karnga, Jr., Rights Groups Intensify Campaign Against Firestone, THE




6 Haider Rizvi, Firestone Sued Over "Slave" Plantation, ONEWORLD, Dec. 8, 2005,
available at http://www.corpwatch.org/print-article.php?id=12860.
7 Firestone was founded in 1900 by American Harvey Firestone. A Brief History of
Bridgestone Americas, http://www.bridgestone-firestone.com/news/mediacenter/BFSHistory
.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). Bridgestone (owned by a Japanese conglomerate) acquired
Firestone in 1988. Id. "Bridgestone" is the English translation of its Japanese founder's sur-
name. Id. He apparently thought that an English-sounding company name would stimulate
more product sales in the United States.
8 Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Fair Labor Standards Act, for exam-
ple, apply extraterritorially. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201(2000).
9 See Firestone Complaint, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that "the Plaintiffs bring their ATS
actions in the United States because the judicial system in Liberia is, according to the U.S.
State Department, largely dysfunctional[, corrupt,] and still suffering from the effects of the
devastation brought by Liberia's recently suspended civil war").
10 The ATCA is often also referred to as the "Alien Tort Statute." For consistency's sake,
this Note uses two shorthand references throughout: ATCA, the abbreviation for "Alien Tort
Claims Act," and simply "the Act."
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Over the last ten years, lawsuits against American multinational
corporations accused of instigating, aiding, or abetting human rights viola-
tions have invoked the ATCA with increased frequency. In response to this
wave of litigation, the U.S. business community, along with Bush admini-
stration officials and members of Congress, proposed to amend the ATCA
to limit or foreclose lawsuits against American companies and protect U.S.
foreign policy interests and foreign direct investment. So far no victim of
corporate abuse has won an ATCA claim, but plaintiffs are inching closer to
success. At least ten major cases are pending against American companies
and could go to trial in 2007. Battle lines between business-friendly bureau-
crats and human rights activists have been clearly drawn and advocates on
both sides are engaged in a bitter debate implicating a vast range of social
and economic policies.
This Note explores the controversy around recent efforts to amend
the ATCA. After analyzing key arguments on both sides of the dispute, the
Note concludes that the ATCA should remain unchanged. In its current
form, the Act creates a private cause of action for foreign plaintiffs injured
by American corporations operating internationally. Thus the ATCA is a
crucial tool for regulating corporate behavior and helping uphold the United
States' purported commitment to human rights around the world. Changes
to the law would reduce its potential to supply relief in cases when Ameri-
can businesses dishonor that commitment.
Human rights law and international labor law are robust fields of
inquiry. Studies covering globalization's impact on human rights and
worldwide labor standards have flourished since the 1970s. Around that
time, technological advances allowed Western companies to move substan-
tial amounts of capital (the means of production) overseas and reduce manu-
facturing costs by hiring foreign workers at wages lower than those man-
dated in more developed countries. This Note taps into a rich vein of re-
search and commentary on this phenomenon and on the ATCA itself. The
paper's contribution lies in its analysis of specific proposed changes to the
ATCA-the first in two hundred years-that could eventually become law.
Section II briefly discusses the ATCA's revival after nearly two
centuries of neglect. This section summarizes several important cases whose
holdings set the stage for the Act's application to corporations. Section III
reviews the main arguments for and against amending the ATCA. It evalu-
ates several criticisms and defenses raised by human rights groups, mem-
bers of Congress, the Bush administration, and business executives. Section
IV examines a proposed law submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee in
October 2005 intended to "clarify" the ATCA. The bill was withdrawn un-
der pressure from human rights groups, but the draft offers valuable insights
into the motives of ATCA reformers. Finally, section V argues that the
ATCA should remain unchanged because its power to protect human rights
2006-2007]
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outweighs its possible negative impact on American overseas investments
and foreign policy efforts.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act's History
1. Creation and Purpose
The ATCA is an ancient law by American standards. It was part of
the 1798 Judiciary Act, one of the first bills the Founders enacted after the
Constitution's ratification. Its entire text-a single sentence-reads as fol-
lows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction for any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States. 
11
Essentially, the Act opens American courts to non-citizen plaintiffs
who are victims of a tort committed in violation of an international law rec-
ognized by the United States. More specifically, the Act confers subject
matter jurisdiction on the federal district courts in cases where aliens bring a
tortious claim for conduct that violates the terms of a treaty to which the
United States is a signatory, or any act contrary to the "law of nations."
This latter provision (an act contrary to the "law of nations") func-
tions as a sort of residuary clause. Treaty interpretation is a relatively
straightforward process. Committing an act specifically proscribed by treaty
language constitutes an actionable tort under the ATCA. The "law of na-
tions," on the other hand, is not precisely defined, neither in the Act nor the
field of international law generally. One scholar says the "law of nations"
refers to "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon
civilized states in their relations with one another."12 Original sources for
the "law of nations" vary and are often inconsistent. This inconsistency has
made it difficult to determine exactly what protections the ATCA affords
and what offenses it covers.
Legal historians do not fully understand why the Founders drafted
the ATCA. One theory holds that the law was meant to discourage citizens
from provoking foreigners on U.S. soil (and thereby avoid triggering wars
amidst the fragile peace that followed the end of the American Revolu-
tion). 13 Another suggests that the Act codified a moral obligation of the new
" 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
12 JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (6th ed. 1963).
13 See Brad J. Kieserman, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH U.L. REv. 881, 891 (1999).
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nation to police international legal norms within its borders. 14 Still another
says it was designed to safeguard foreign merchants conducting commerce
on the seas.15 The most plausible reason is that the Act protected foreign
diplomats from tortious acts during their appointed terms of service in the
United States.' 6 What is certain is that the ATCA reflects its drafters' belief
that the law of international norms should be incorporated into American
federal common law. 17
Just as little is known about what parties the ATCA was designed to
protect. Who qualifies as an "alien?" And who (or what) exactly is subject
to suit under the ATCA? Must-or may-defendants be foreigners as well?
Could the Founders, in the days before the rise of commercial corporations
as they are known today, have envisioned American businesses being liable
under the Act? Courts had few chances to consider these questions until
near the end of the twentieth century because the ATCA was so seldom
invoked. Moreover, before the mid-twentieth century, international law was
understood to govern only diplomacy between nation-states. In other words,
international laws applied to and could be violated only by governments,
not people.
After World War II, increased economic productivity encouraged
global commerce and more frequent interactions between Americans and
citizens of different countries. It therefore made sense for courts to apply
international law to the relationships between people, and not just nations.
Courts began holding that "persons" should be seen as "subject to and bene-
fiting from" international law.'
8
It is important to note that the conventional legal definition of "per-
sons" includes both human individuals and entities, including corporations,
that share the same rights as individuals. Legally speaking, corporations are
"entit[ies] having authority under law to act as a single person . . . [or] a
group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal rules
into a legal or juristic person."' 9 Thus corporations have theoretically been
susceptible to suit under the ATCA for as long as courts have held that the
ATCA should apply to non-state actors.
But probably the most contentious issue in interpreting the ATCA is
whether the statute merely confers jurisdiction or does something more-
that is, whether it actually creates a cause of action for a plaintiff to sue for
14 See id.
15 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING THE MONSTER:
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 3, n.1 (2003).
16 See Kieserman, supra note 13, at 891.
17 Id. at 893, n.57 (citations omitted).
18 BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, at
15 (4th ed. 2003).
19 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999).
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a tort committed in violation of a treaty or customary international law.
Those arguing that the statute furnishes its own cause of action believe that
the phrase "for any civil action" creates a private right to sue. Opponents of
this view say that the statute only provides a jurisdictional grant. According
to this perspective, before a plaintiff can actually sue under the ATCA, the
U.S. Congress must pass "enabling" legislation listing one or more tortious
claims (e.g., torture, slavery, or some other internationally recognized of-
fense)for which the ATCA confers jurisdiction on the federal courts.
As discussed below, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals proposed
its own solution to this problem in a 1979 opinion binding courts only
within that circuit. In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Second
Circuit's view in a landmark decision-Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain-that
strengthened the ATCA's influence in human rights cases. 20 Sosa was the
impetus prompting ATCA reform proposals from indignant corporate ex-
ecutives and the Bush administration. The debate rages on today.
2. Filartiga and the ATCA's Rediscovery
The ATCA was practically forgotten for its first two centuries. No
more than two recorded cases directly addressed it before 1979.21 The fol-
lowing year, the Second Circuit tackled the jurisdiction versus cause-of-
action question in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.22
Plaintiff Joel Filartiga was a Paraguayan doctor and political oppo-
nent of Alfredo Stroessner, who became Paraguay's president in 1954. In
1976, Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, a Stroessner crony, kidnapped and tor-
tured to death the doctor's seventeen-year old son Joelito. Pena had the
boy's mutilated body delivered to the home of the victim's sister, Dr. Filar-
tiga's daughter, Dolly, and informed her that Joelito had been killed in re-
prisal for her father's political activities. Filartiga filed a criminal charge in
the Paraguayan courts, but shortly afterward his lawyer was abducted,
shackled to a wall in the local police headquarters, and threatened with
death. Not surprisingly, the Paraguayan case went nowhere. 3
Some years later, while both were living in New York City, Dolly
Filartiga sued Pena in federal district court over her brother's torture, a vio-
lation of international law covered by the ATCA. The district court granted
Pena's motion to dismiss because it believed the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Its reasoning was based on prior Second Circuit decisions hold-
20 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
21 Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the
Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International
Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 105-06 (2005).




ing that "violations of the law of nations do not occur when the aggrieved
parties are nationals of the acting state., 24 (Pena was presumed to have
acted on the Paraguayan government's behalf.) But the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that its earlier rule was
"clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of international
law.",25 The Court suggested that all the world's nations should police tor-
ture whether inflicted on a government's own citizens or otherwise.
Filartiga was significant mainly for two reasons. First, the case ex-
panded the range of offenses to which the ATCA applied. The Second Cir-
cuit declined to hold, as previous cases had, that the only "law of nations"
violations chargeable under the ATCA were those U.S. courts recognized in
1789.26 Rather, new international norms should be regularly acknowledged
according to civilization's evolving moral standards. The Court created a
test for determining when an offense believed to violate international law
comes within the ATCA's coverage: (1) "the wrong must be a violation that
'commands the general assent of civilized nations'; (2) "the prohibition
against the wrong must be 'clear and unambiguous"'; and (3) "the nations
of the world must demonstrate expressly by international accords 'that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern.'
27
Second, and equally important, the Court held that the ATCA cre-
ates a cause of action rather than just conferring jurisdiction in cases involv-
28ing international law violations. Because the case did not bind other fed-
eral circuits, however, this issue was not altogether settled. Four years later,
in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Robert Bork of the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's view and held that the
ATCA did no more than confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear claims
for which a cause of action was created through separate Congressional
legislation.2 9 With competing circuits reaching different conclusions about
the extent of the ATCA's power, uncertainty over the jurisdiction versus
cause-of-action question persisted for another twenty years.
ATCA cases following Filartiga dealt further with the question of
who could be charged under the Act. In 1995, the Second Circuit considered
the ATCA again in Kadic v. Karadi6.30 Victims of brutal crimes committed
by Bosnian-Serb military forces during the disintegration of Yugoslavia
24 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (quoting Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24,
31(1976)).
25 Id. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980)).
26 See generally 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
27 Kieserman, supra note 13, at 899 (footnotes omitted).
28 Courtney Shaw, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1359, 1365 (2002).
29 726 F.2d 774 (1984).
'o 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995).
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used the ATCA to sue the militia's commander in the United States. Ini-
tially, a district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling
that under Filartiga, the ATCA confers jurisdiction (and creates a cause of
action) only in cases where an international tort is committed by a state ac-
tor. But Karadai6 commanded a militia representing a government recog-
nized by neither the United States nor the United Nations, so the district
court did not consider him a "state actor.",
31
The Second Circuit once again reversed. It held that especially
when violations of customary international law are egregious, the ATCA
confers federal subject matter jurisdiction even on private actors-that is,
individual persons. In other words, "state action is not necessary for a cog-
nizable violation of the law of nations to exist. 3 2 Given corporations' his-
toric classification as "persons," the Filartiga holding exposed American
multinational companies to ATCA liability for the first time.
B. Recent Interpretations and Application of the A TCA
1. Corporations Come Under Fire: The Unocal Case
If the ATCA creates its own cause of action, and if corporations are
eligible defendants, then what level of culpability is required for liability to
attach? ATCA jurisprudence evolved along these lines a few years after
Kadic. In 1997, the California energy company Unocal became the first
American corporation sued for human rights abuses under the ATCA.33 In
Doe v. Unocal, the plaintiffs were rural villagers in Burma, where Unocal
was constructing a pipeline to transport oil welled in the Indian Ocean to
land-based processing facilities.34 The plaintiffs claimed that members of
the Burmese military, hired to protect the pipeline project's American su-
pervisors, brutally raped, tortured, and killed villagers building helipads and
clearing forest for Unocal buildings.
The case survived the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, 35 but it failed to survive a motion for summary
judgment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the summary judg-
ment ruling. It found sufficient evidence of cognizable human rights abuses
31 Nor could Karadli6 be granted head of state immunity. The head of state immunity
doctrine is based on common law principles. The district court explained that if the U.S.
president had explicitly recognized the Bosnian-Serb faction and asked that Karadli6 be
given head of state immunity, its consideration of the case would amount to an improper
advisory opinion, requiring dismissal on that ground. See generally Doe v. Karadlii, 866 F.
Supp. 734 (1994).
32 Kochan, supra note 21, at 115.
33 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.Cal.1997).
14 Id. at 883-85.
" Id. at 884.
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and concluded that Unocal could be responsible for those abuses if it pro-
vided "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that ha[d] a substan-
tial effect on the perpetration of the crime[s]. '36 The Ninth Circuit likened
this degree of involvement to "aiding and abetting." The court remanded the
case to the Central District of California.
Rather than defend itself at trial, Unocal settled the suit in late 2004
for an undisclosed amount of money. Human rights advocates were quick to
read into the settlement an admission of guilt on Unocal's part. ATCA crit-
ics charged that the plaintiffs' claims were unfounded and that they com-
prised nothing more than a "strike suit" intended to force Unocal to settle
rather than risk more damaging publicity and costly litigation. The Burmese
plaintiffs might narrowly have missed a chance to win the first ATCA
judgment against an American corporation. But the Ninth Circuit's decision
clearly underscored corporations' vulnerability despite the case's outcome.
2. The Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain Case: Filartiga Confirmed
In 2004 the ATCA debate came to a head in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.3 7 In Sosa, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain sued the U.S. govern-
ment for kidnapping him (a violation of the "law of nations") in 1985. Alva-
rez was suspected in the murder of an American Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) agent in Mexico. When Mexico refused to extradite him, American
officials recruited several Mexicans, including petitioner Jose Francisco
Sosa, to abduct Alvarez and bring him to the United States, where he could
be charged and brought to court. A California jury acquitted Alvarez of in-
volvement in the agent's murder, and the doctor then sued the U.S. govern-
ment for his detention.
The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal, meaning its result
would fix the rules governing the ATCA's application throughout the fed-
eral court system. The Court affirmed Filartiga's holding that claims under
the ATCA do not first require separate Congressional action. The majority
opinion, authored by Justice Souter, explained that:
the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the [ATCA]
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law....
The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the under-
standing that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time.
38
36 Doe I v. Unocal Corp. 395 F.3d 932, 947 (2002).
31 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
31 Id. at 724.
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Sosa was a major front in the ATCA amendment battle. Dozens of
amicus briefs were filed in support on each side. Corporation lobbyists ar-
gued that the law should not be applicable absent separate legislation by
Congress. Meanwhile, the Bush administration's position was, as one vocal
critic characterized it, that "the entire [ATCA] law should cease to func-
tion."39 These and other opponents argued that the administration's ap-
proach was inconsistent with prior judicial interpretation as well as the lan-
guage of the ATCA itself-which plainly states that "aliens" can bring a
"civil action" for a "tort." In a March 2004 editorial, Professor Anthony
Sebok noted the irony of the administration's skepticism about the ATCA's
purpose given Republicans' traditional devotion to "textualist" approaches
to statutory interpretation.4 °
Dr. Alvarez-Machain lost his case in Sosa-the Court found that his
abduction and brief detention did not constitute a violation of customary
international law. But Sosa resolved the Circuit Courts' differences over the
cause-of-action question and made clear that foreign plaintiffs could sue
either public officials or private parties in U.S. courts for serious human
rights abuses. The Supreme Court's decision put corporations doing busi-
ness abroad on notice.
Before Sosa, the ATCA debate smoldered among a small crowd of
corporate lawyers, human rights advocates, and political buffs. Aside from
some modest publicity generated when Holocaust survivors sued Swiss
banks that supported Germany's Nazi regime, few news items about the
ATCA reached the public. But Sosa carried the discussion beyond the busi-
ness and lobbying communities and raised the interest of non-profit groups
and private citizens concerned about corporate accountability and human
rights.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court cast aside conservatives' pleas to reject
the Second Circuit's Filartiga holding. The Court instead affirmed Filar-
tiga, verifying that the ATCA created its own cause of action-without the
need for further legislation-for plaintiffs who could prove injury by a vio-
lation of international law. Supreme Court watchers quickly anticipated that
business lobbyists would try to persuade Congress to revise the ATCA in
light of the Court's holding. And in fact, in light of their conclusion that no
actionable tort occurred in Sosa, the Justices invited Congress to specify
41which offenses should trigger ATCA jurisdiction. It took nearly a year, but
39 EarthRights International, In Our Court: ATCA, Sosa, and the Triumph of Human
Rights, 5 (July 2004), available at http://www.earthrights.org/files/Reports/inourcourt.pdf
[hereinafter EarthRights International Report].
40 Anthony J. Sebok, FindLaw Forum: The Supreme Court Confronts the Alien Tort
Claims Act: Should the Court Gut the Law, as the Administration Suggests? (Mar. 22, 2004),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20040322.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
41 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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one member accepted the invitation. Before turning to that member's pro-
posal, the next section examines the substance of the ATCA amendment
debate.
III. PRESERVATION OR EVISCERATION?: ANALYZING THE ARGUMENTS FOR
AND AGAINST ATCA AMENDMENTS
Though public debate has intensified, much discussion about the
ATCA is still confined to exchanges between the three branches of govern-
ment and between representatives of human rights organizations and mem-
bers of Congress, business executives, and Bush administration officials. In
particular, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and its Executive
Director, Terry Collingsworth, have vigorously defended the ATCA while
overseeing at least six pending ATCA lawsuits.42 The ILRF's opinions are
reflected in a series of papers and press releases that discuss their ongoing
representation of ATCA plaintiffs. This section relies on that material and
on federal court filings and government documents to describe both parties'
positions.
A. Arguments Favoring A TCA Amendment
1. Who Favors Amendment?
Generally, those favoring ATCA amendment represent large inter-
national companies and their supporters in state and federal government.
This includes corporate legal counsel, corporate executives, and national
lobbying associations representing small and large businesses. In addition,
the Bush administration, which strongly backs the business community,
believes ATCA litigation compromises corporations' ability to expand op-
erations, generate profit, and bring new products to foreign markets. These
groups believe that the threat of ATCA litigation needlessly prevents corpo-
rations from conducting operations in any country with a questionable hu-
man rights record.
The ATCA debate splits somewhat along ideological lines-with
conservatives supporting change and liberals supporting the status quo-but
the breakdown is not entirely clear-cut. For example, as Section IV ex-
plains, a Democratic Senator introduced a 2005 bill that proposed sweeping
changes to the ATCA. And no doubt some human rights advocates agree
42 The International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) was founded in 1986. According to the
Fund's web site, the ILRF "promote[s] enforcement of labor rights internationally through
public education and mobilization, research, litigation, legislation, and collaboration with
labor, government and business groups." International Labor Rights Fund, About the Interna-
tional Labor Rights Fund, http://www.laborrights.org/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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with the Bush administration's position that the current ATCA undermines
other, more direct efforts to strengthen human rights.
2. What Are the Arguments for Amendment?
Those who support amending the ATCA level two main criticisms
against the recent trend in litigation. One is that ATCA lawsuits make it
difficult for the executive branch to negotiate foreign policy. Non-citizen
plaintiffs often implicate their own countries' governments when bringing
human rights claims in American courts. Foreign officials resent the con-
demnatory signals these cases send as well as having their legal disputes
appropriated by the U.S. judicial system. ATCA reformers argue that this
"judicial imperialism" patronizes foreign governments, undermines their
sovereignty, and thereby creates a dangerous obstacle to effective diplo-
macy. For U.S. courts to provide recourse to other countries' citizens sug-
gests, rightly or wrongly, that those countries' court systems are not
equipped to handle human rights cases.43
A second criticism is that ATCA litigation threatens foreign trade
and foreign direct investment. A potential "floodgates" problem exists be-
cause so many American corporations now do business abroad. If enough
plaintiffs recover damages under the ATCA, other corporate suits will fol-
low and the floodgates will burst, forcing corporations to withdraw from
overseas operations out of fear that adverse judgments could drain their
assets. Some observers see ATCA litigation "threaten[ing] to spin out of
control" and believe that corporations' fear of ATCA lawsuits will cause
them to forego lucrative investment opportunities in underdeveloped na-
tions. 44
a. September 11, 2001 and the Foreign Policy Problem
Most of the ATCA cases filed in U.S. courts have involved grievous
human rights abuses (e.g., slavery or torture). Government agents in the
plaintiffs' home country, acting in complicity with corporate agents or at
least without the corporation's disapproval, allegedly perpetrate many of the
abuses. When federal courts hear ATCA cases involving accusations against
foreign governments, those governments are impliedly served notice that
their human rights safeguards fail to meet international standards. This, ac-
cording to ATCA critics, undercuts diplomatic efforts between American
officials and the country in question, a problem that has only worsened
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
43 See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 15, at 47-48.
44 Id. at 7.
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The increase in ATCA litigation has coincided with the Bush ad-
ministration's efforts to recruit allies in Muslim-majority countries in the
war on terror. Administration members believe that ATCA litigation seri-
ously threatens these crucial diplomatic efforts. A recent ATCA case against
Exxon Mobil (brought by the ILRF) illustrates this problem.
In July 2002, less than a year after the September 11 th terrorist at-
tacks, foreign plaintiffs sued the Exxon Mobil corporation for supposedly
encouraging Indonesian soldiers to assault and torture workers at one of its
off-shore oil facilities in Indonesia's Aceh province. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit asked the U.S. State Department to brief
them on the lawsuit's potential negative effect on foreign policy strategies
in Southeast Asia. The State Department responded with a letter asking that
the Court dismiss the lawsuit.45
Partly motivating the State Department's request was another letter
sent by Indonesia's U.S. ambassador. The ambassador's letter stated that "as
a matter of principle, [Indonesia] cannot accept the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States over an allegation against an Indonesian govern-
ment institution ... for operations taking place in Indonesia. 4 6 The State
Department thus urged dismissal on grounds that the "[government of Indo-
nesia] may respond to the litigation by curtailing cooperation with the
United States on issues of substantial importance to the United States" and
that the lawsuit "could potentially disrupt the ongoing and extensive [U.S.]
efforts to secure Indonesia's cooperation in the fight against international
terrorist activity. 47 The court declined to dismiss the case, and as of Janu-
ary 2007 the parties were preparing for trial.
Similar tensions have arisen over ATCA cases from South Africa.
Plaintiffs have sued American companies that collaborated with apartheid-
era businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. The South African government op-
poses the lawsuits because it believes the suits compromise the country's
own efforts to fashion a post-apartheid legal system that "achieves recon-
ciliation and reconstruction., 48
45 EarthRights International Report, supra note 38, at 10-12.
46 Letter from Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat, Ambassador of Indonesia, to Richard Armit-
age, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (July 15, 2002), available at http://
www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/stateexxonmobil.pdf (following letter
from Taft, U.S. Department of State).
47 Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to the
Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, U.S. Dist. Court, D.C. Circuit (July 29, 2002), available at
http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/stateexxonmobil.pdf.
48 Brief for Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Brief for the Peti-
tioner].
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Amicus briefs from the Sosa case set forth similar assertions. For
example, the National Foreign Trade Council's brief insists that ATCA liti-
gation "interferes with" foreign policy because such litigation has the effect
of letting "private litigants ... substitute their own human rights agenda for
that of the country's elected officials." 49 Moreover, the brief argues that the
executive branch needs flexibility to balance its human rights agenda with
its trade, investment, and economic cooperation agendas. 50 American for-
eign policy's effectiveness, the brief suggests, depends on the executive's
ability to prioritize one agenda over another in any given part of the world.
b. Curtailed Foreign Direct Investment and the "Floodgates" Problem
ATCA critics view the increase in lawsuits as a gathering storm of
ATCA litigation that will overwhelm the overseas American business com-
munity with accusations of human rights abuse. A flood of ATCA litigation
could erode American business initiative in foreign markets and subject
U.S. corporations to costly judgments. Two Institute for International Eco-
nomics researchers published a monograph in July 2003 outlining many of
the economic problems that "awakening [the ATCA] monster" could cause.
The study characterized the problem with this example:
Within the next decade... 100,000 class action Chinese plaintiffs, organ-
ized by New York trial lawyers, could sue General Motors, Toyota, Volks-
wagen, General Electric, Mitsubishi, Siemens, Motorola, NTT, Nokia, and
20 other blue-chip corporations in a federal court for abetting China's de-
nial of political rights, for observing China's restrictions on trade unions,
and for impairing the Chinese environment. These plaintiffs might claim
actual damages of $6 billion and punitive damages of $20 billion. To mini-
mize their exposure to punitive damages, the corporations could settle for
an intermediate amount, such as $10 billion. 5'
The study paints a stark picture for corporations. As the authors
suggest, if enough ATCA lawsuits succeed, plaintiffs' lawyers will sue any
corporation suspected of tolerating human rights abuses at its overseas fa-
cilities. Even if the claims are meritless, those companies will face "enor-
mous discovery costs" in the course of proving the allegations untrue.
52
Plaintiffs' lawyers would likely not be susceptible to libel lawsuits for any
public statements about the allegations made before or during trial, putting a
company's reputation at further risk.53 Finally, the study argues that prolif-
41 Id. at 13.
50 See id. at 13-14.
51 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 15, at 1.




erating ATCA lawsuits will reduce American investments overseas. The
authors estimate that some fifty-five billion dollars in U.S. foreign direct
investment could be forfeited due to threats of ATCA litigation.
The Sosa briefs echo most of these economic worries. The National
Foreign Trade Council told the Sosa court that the potential for ATCA liti-
gation puts American companies at an unfair disadvantage in international
markets since it "can result in higher insurance costs, difficulties accessing
capital markets, and negative effects on shareholder confidence and stock
prices. The foreseeable result," says the Council's brief, "is less investment
and trade with developing countries, and less international trade overall. 54
Corporations and their representatives within the lobbying commu-
nity and the federal government make a strong case that ATCA lawsuits
impede policy implementation and negatively impact investment overseas.
And the reactions of foreign governments-including Indonesia and South
Africa-vindicate the Bush administration's belief that the lawsuits offend
other countries' ideas of sovereignty. The question the ATCA's defenders
raise is whether those concerns should prevail over foreign workers' right to
seek redress in American courts.
B. Arguments Against ATCA Amendments
1. Who Opposes Amendments?
Behind proposals to leave the ATCA unchanged is a network of
human rights organizations, law professors, and citizen groups supporting
stricter accountability for multinational corporations. Each sees the ATCA
as an important tool for protecting foreign workers' rights and for ensuring
that multinational corporations do not knowingly tolerate abuses committed
by their employees or by agents of host country governments with whom
they may be cooperating.
Human rights groups have had a vital role in distributing informa-
tion about the ATCA's purpose and coordinating opposition to proposed
amendments. In July 2004, shortly after the Supreme Court's Sosa ruling,
the organization EarthRights International produced a detailed report about
the Alien Tort Claims Act and what it called a "war on ATCA" being
waged by the Bush administration and corporate lobbyists.5 5 The report
captured the sentiments of most ATCA supporters in suggesting that "the
real provocation for this [anti-ATCA] stance from a business-friendly Ad-
ministration is not a principled legal objection to ATCA, but a desire to end
the cases against corporations. 56
54 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 47, at 11.
55 See generally EarthRights International Report, supra note 38.
56 Id. at 12.
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Several law professors have figured prominently in the ATCA de-
bate through their affidavits and amicus briefs in ATCA cases, scholarly
articles, opinion pieces, and consultations with courts and government
agencies. Two such professors are quoted below.
2. What Are the Arguments for Leaving the ATCA Unchanged?
Opponents of ATCA amendment argue that the Act supports social
justice for foreign citizens employed by or working alongside American
multinational corporations. Because their influence on the legal process is
less direct than that of the business lobby and the executive branch, the case
made by those supporting ATCA preservation comprises a rebuttal to points
raised by those favoring amendment. Thus those who defend the status quo
argue that the ATCA does not hamper foreign policy efforts and does not
stifle foreign direct investment. The ERI Report contemplates that even if
the law did cause those outcomes, their consequences would not warrant
"eviscerating" all the ATCA's provisions.57
With respect to diplomacy and U.S. foreign policy goals, ERI
claims that "by promoting respect for human rights, [the] ATCA implements
U.S. foreign policy" rather than undermining it.5 8 Pointing out that "Con-
gress has mandated that 'a principle goal' of U.S. foreign policy 'shall be to
promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights by all countries,"' the group emphasizes that enforcing ATCA claims
actually furthers the goal of promoting human rights.
In building its case against Exxon Mobil, the ILRF solicited an affi-
davit from Harold Koh, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor and currently Dean of Yale Law School.59 Koh
asserted that claims such as those made by the Exxon Mobil plaintiffs "are
subject to judicially manageable standards and do not require policy deter-
minations that properly fall within non-judicial discretion., 60
The Act's supporters also doubt the Bush administration's claims
that ATCA litigation hurts the executive branch's efforts in the war on ter-
ror. Collingsworth even contends that with respect to the Exxon Mobil case
"the State Department has compromised its credibility on human rights is-
sues by taking a position ... utterly lacking in objective support and...
inconsistent with past efforts directed to improving human rights in Indone-
17 Id. at 13.
58 Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
59 Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact From Fiction in the Debate Over Application of
the Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of Fundamental Human Rights by Corporations, 37




sia.,, 61 He points out that American efforts to stimulate human rights ad-
vances in Indonesia have had little success given the Indonesian govern-
ment's repeated "failure[s to] .. punish human rights violations perpetrated
by its military security forces. 62 Perhaps more important, as Harvard law
professor and former National Committee on Terrorism member Juliette
Kayyem observed in an Exxon Mobil affidavit, it is often American multi-
national companies' exploitative behavior that fuels anger among foreign
populations and instigates terrorism in the first place.63
Finally, the Act's supporters discount claims that ATCA litigation
will limit overseas investment and adversely affect the U.S. economy.
Collingsworth writes that "there are few companies... seeking to invest in
projects that would compel knowing corporate participation in genocide,
war crimes ... or crimes against humanity .... [T]he ATCA will have no
impact on legitimate foreign investment." 64 Moreover, it seems unlikely that
cash-strapped developing countries would decline foreign direct investment
in their infrastructure. Thus corporations cannot plausibly argue that foreign
governments may resist corporate expansion in their countries rather than
risk being implicated in human rights violations.
IV. THE FEINSTEIN PROPOSAL: AN ANALYSIS
A. What the Bill Proposes
One member of Congress recently responded to the Sosa court's re-
quest for guidance on the ATCA's future scope. On October 15, 2005, Cali-
fornia senator Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat, introduced Senate Bill S. 1874,
titled the "Alien Tort Statute Reform Act., 65 Rather than simply list the
offenses that would trigger ATCA jurisdiction, the bill recommended
changing the Act wholesale. According to Senator Feinstein, one of the
bill's purposes was to "clarify jurisdiction" of the federal courts in ATCA
cases following the Sosa decision.66 More broadly, the drafters designed the
bill to "balance the competing interests of U.S. companies and human rights
groups."6 7
Many of Feinstein's proposed revisions mirror proposals by the
business community. The bill surely received some of its inspiration from
61 Id. at 574.
62 Id. at 576.
63 See id. at 577.
64 Id. at 570.
65 S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005).
66 Id.
67 Marcel Herbke, US Bill Puts Oil Before Human Rights, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Oct.
26, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2005/1026oil.htm.
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Sosa amicus briefs filed by pro-corporation groups opposing ATCA litiga-
tion. And it seems directly responsive to charges that the ATCA "has been
transformed from its intended role as a jurisdictional provision applicable to
a small class of cases into a serious impediment to companies engaged in
international trade, investment, and operations, and a major irritant to the
United States in its dealings with other nations. 68
Overall, Feinstein's bill would have lengthened the ATCA, detail-
ing what specific torts are actionable and who can bring a cause of action. It
would have also limited the conditions under which a corporation (or any
private actor) would be liable.69 Had the proposed statute become law, it
would have changed the outcome in future cases like those discussed in
Section I. The following paragraphs discuss the parts of the bill with the
greatest impact on plaintiffs' ability to sue. All come under Section 2 of the
bill.7°
Subsection (b) defines various terms common to ATCA cases. "De-
fendant" would include "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, including" U.S. citizens, naturalized residents (both temporary and
permanent), and partnerships, corporations, or "other legal entit[ies]" organ-
ized under U.S. law.7' This subsection partly leaves open the question who
might qualify as "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Corpora-
tions determined to avoid ATCA liability might creatively structure their
businesses in such as way as to make offending sectors not subject to U.S.
law. Subsection (a) also specifically forbids courts from hearing any case
involving a tort committed by a "foreign state" within its sovereign terri-
tory.
Subsection (b)(3) sets forth a list of torts actionable under the
ATCA-extrajudicial killings, genocide, piracy, slave trading, slavery, and
torture. Presumably, the list was meant to be exclusive. While many corpo-
rate ATCA cases filed prior to 2007 involved one or more of these offenses,
the torts often were not committed by American (or Western) employees but
by foreign workers or military personnel under contract with the defendant.
When read together with subsection (a)'s requirements, subsection (b)(3)
seems to foreclose lawsuits in nearly all situations where plaintiffs are in-
jured by non-resident employers in their own country.
Amendment opponents are likely to find subsections (c) through (f)
as unpalatable. Subsection (c) specifies that ATCA liability only attaches to
"direct participant[s] acting with specific intent to commit a tort referred to
68 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 47, at 5.
69 Alien Tort Statute Reform Act, S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005).
70 The bill contains two sections: Section 1, "Short Title" and Section 2, "Suits by Aliens."
71 Alien Tort Statute Reform Act, S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005).
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in subsection (a)."72 This portion would relieve corporations of wrongdoing
in cases where plaintiffs were unable to prove malicious intent on the corpo-
ration's part (which would seem true in any case where foreign soldiers or
government agents commit alleged abuses). This would eliminate liability
under the "aiding and abetting" standard legitimized in Unocal.73 As long as
corporations do no more than provide moral support to the tortfeasors, they
would remain free from liability.
Subsection (d) demands that plaintiffs exhaust their remedies "in
the place where the injury occurred." As the Firestone plaintiffs' complaint
suggests, obtaining relief in many developing countries' court systems is
simply not possible. Requiring plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies virtually
guarantees that many will never reach U.S. courts; instead their cases will
pend indefinitely in courts in their home countries.74 Equally possible is that
some foreign governments may pressure their judiciary to ignore or dismiss
controversial cases.
Human rights groups likely take greatest issue with subsection (e).
This part gives the president authority to request that federal courts not hear
cases that could conflict with the executive branch's foreign policy efforts.
That provision reads as follows:
No court in the United States shall proceed in considering the merits of a
claim under subsection (a) if the President, or a designee of the President,
adequately certifies to the court in writing that such exercise of jurisdiction
will have a negative impact on the foreign policy interests of the United
States. 75
Permitting the president to overrule court jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis would likely implicate concerns over constitutional separation of pow-
ers. But that possibility clearly reflects the Bush administration's desire that
the executive branch control which ATCA cases come before the courts and
which do not.
Subsection (f) covers "procedural requirements." Under this sec-
tion, "the first and last names of all plaintiffs shall be disclosed in the com-
plaint filed with the court." No exception is provided, however, in cases
where plaintiffs' lives or safety may be at risk if their identity is disclosed.
(Anonymous plaintiffs file virtually all ATCA lawsuits against multina-
tional corporations.) Finally, subsection (h) requires that plaintiffs bring
ATCA claims within ten years of the date of the injury.
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 Eliza Strickland, Was DiFi Batting for Big Oil?, EAST BAY EXPRESS, Nov. 9, 2005,
http://www.laborrights.org/press/general/feinsteinatca-eastbayexpress_110905.htm.
74 Several federal circuits read an exhaustion requirement into the ATCA already; still
others borrowed a ten-year statute of limitations from the Torture Victims Protection Act.
75 Alien Tort Statute Reform Act, S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005).
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B. Reaction to the Bill
Human rights advocates reacted quickly to Feinstein's proposal.
Critics flooded her office with complaints within days of the bill's introduc-
tion in Congress. As a result, Feinstein asked that Congress remove the bill
from consideration pending "refinement in light of concerns raised by hu-
man rights advocates."
76
The criticisms were two-fold. First, the revisions would supersede
key ATCA decisions like Filartiga and Sosa. Second, opponents argued,
Feinstein only submitted the bill in response to pressure from multinational
corporations headquartered in her Congressional district. Feinstein observed
in her Senate floor remarks that "numerous companies in California are in
the midst of these [ATCA] lawsuits as defendants."77 The oil company
Chevron, which contributed more than thirty thousand dollars to Feinstein's
campaigns between 1989 and 2005, has its principle offices in San Ramon,
California. Significantly, Nigerian plaintiffs named Chevron a defendant in
an ATCA lawsuit scheduled for trial in late 2006.78
Feinstein evidently has no plans to reintroduce the bill, but any
member of Congress who relies heavily on corporate campaign contribu-
tions may pursue ATCA amendments in the future.79 At any rate, Fein-
stein's bill, now part of the Congressional Record, is a model for what the
ATCA may look like if corporations and their supporters can quiet resis-
tance from human rights organizations and persuade Congress to revise the
Act.
V. WHY THE ATCA SHOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED
Globalization has transformed the world economy and cast doubt on
the validity of certain aspects of classic trade theory. Historically, a corpora-
tion's means of production were fixed in one location. Thus companies
would export their manufactured goods for sale in countries whose busi-
nesses lacked the capacity to produce those same goods at lesser expense.
Once corporations could "outsource" the manufacturing process, labor costs
became much more variable. Domestic labor laws requiring minimum
wages and fringe benefits no longer constrained a company's bottom line-
companies simply moved labor-intensive operations to other countries with
fewer wage and labor regulations.
76 Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein to Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman, Judiciary
Committee (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.earthrights.org/files/Documents/feinste
inatca.pdf.





The debate over whether Congress should amend the ATCA to limit
corporate liability parallels a broader debate about disparities in global labor
standards. In general, ATCA reformers believe stimulating economic
growth in developing countries provides crucial long-term benefits that
outweigh any short-term financial hardships experienced by those countries'
workforces. Having workers perform difficult manual labor for low wages
is preferable to having them turn to crime or prostitution-alternatives that
the ATCA's critics think likely where population outpaces job growth. The
ATCA's proponents, on the other hand, believe some corporations simply
exploit social and economic conditions in countries with less stringent labor
laws.
The business community and the Bush administration expect a
flood of ATCA litigation to irreparably harm the U.S. and world economy
and deprive "millions of impoverished people .. .[of] an opportunity to
participate in global markets. 80 Administration officials appear to believe
that foreign investment is too essential to the welfare of both Americans and
the international community for legislators to let ATCA litigation impede
such efforts. ATCA opponents accept the possibility that human rights
abuses may go unremedied in exchange for corporations' chance to tap the
vast resources of developing nations. The Act's critics justify low wages
and substandard working conditions on the ground that industrialization
inevitably entails some degree of short-term economic hardship. Besides,
being employed in low-income countries is still better than being unem-
ployed and impoverished. This section sets forth several reasons why Con-
gress should reject these arguments as well as proposals to amend the
ATCA.
First, these views ignore the real suffering of people forced to work
in substandard-indeed, often life-threatening--conditions. Entire genera-
tions of the working class should not have to sacrifice their dignity and
well-being to achieve widespread prosperity in developing nations. That the
world's industrialized countries experienced long, formative periods of en-
vironmental pollution, inequality, and human isolation should not relieve
those countries of the moral obligation to help developing nations do so
more efficiently. There is no justice in permitting Western corporations to
profit by ignoring basic human rights and living standards-even if provid-
ing foreign workers with jobs temporarily lifts them from poverty.
Second, corporations that take advantage of foreign workers, weak
legal systems, and unscrupulous government officials must be accountable
when they violate human rights. When corporations commit human rights
abuses (or less severe labor abuses) or encourage abuses by foreign gov-
ernments or their agents, they erode working-class initiative and frustrate
80 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 15, at 2.
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workers' impulses toward self-preservation and personal improvement.
This, in turn, obstructs social change and democratization. And the United
States and other Western countries lose credibility on the world stage when
they do away with corporate regulatory mechanisms like the ATCA.
The ATCA cannot be used to settle wage disputes or other small-
scale, "shop-floor" worker grievances. Instead the Act is invoked only to
remedy the most egregious human rights violations, including forms of co-
ercion that amount to slavery and torture. Concerns that "the [ATCA] could
lead U.S. courts to become judicial instruments of imperial overstretch,...
[which] would be viewed abroad as blatant American imperialism" seem
overstated.Y It is not so much making justice available to plaintiffs in U.S.
courts as letting American corporations mistreat foreign workers that brews
resentment in other countries. Most corporate defendants in ATCA lawsuits
to date are American companies, and surely benevolent governments would
be willing to give up a measure of judicial independence in exchange for its
citizens' welfare, even if it loses investments as a result.
No country, whether developed or not, should strive to reverse
globalization. Globalization's best features generate jobs and quickly move
goods and information to countries around the world. They also raise living
standards in industrialized countries through economic expansion and crea-
tion of high-skill, high-paying jobs. Globalization has made affordable con-
sumer goods more widely available to low-income people in the United
States and elsewhere. But the lack of a worldwide, enforceable system of
labor standards makes too many foreign workers victims of corporate abuse.
Until better international regulations exist, litigation made possible by laws
like the ATCA provides those workers' most effective recourse.
The ATCA needs no amending. As the Act's supporters point out,
courts can and do filter out weak or frivolous ATCA claims. Decisions al-
ready rendered in the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court established
reasonable guidelines about the sorts of plaintiffs that should have standing.
The Act does not seriously threaten U.S. foreign direct investment or for-
eign policy efforts, and even if it does, those outcomes are worth preventing
the sacrifice too often forced on scores of foreign workers. The ATCA can
offset multinational corporations' political influence and freedom from
oversight by consistently remedying international human rights violations
that occur in the context of the workplace. As the world's richest nation, the
United States has a special moral responsibility to help developing countries
avoid the worst episodes of industrialization.




For two centuries the Alien Tort Claims Act languished in obscu-
rity, attracting little notice in American courts. In the last ten years, lawyers
have used this long-neglected law to bring human rights abusers to justice
and to hold American companies responsible for the welfare of foreign
workers. Multinational corporations sometimes turn a blind eye to the tac-
tics of foreign officials who work with or supervise the companies' employ-
ees. The companies' response to criticism is that American businesses
should not interfere in a sovereign country's politics. But these responses
are fundamentally dishonest. Modem multinational corporations are, in fact,
"alone in possessing the size, technology, and economic reach necessary to
influence human affairs on a global basis. 82 When corporations aggres-
sively enter other countries to tap natural resources and recruit low-wage
workforces, they must accept a corresponding duty to help uphold basic
human rights.
The ATCA partly resulted from the Founders' efforts to "show
European powers that the [United States] would not tolerate flagrant viola-
tions of the 'law of nations[.]"' 83 The Founders probably never imagined the
ease with which Americans can now conduct commerce with other coun-
tries. But even in the grim conditions of life and work in colonial America,
they might have mustered some sympathy for the Firestone plaintiffs. They
wrote the ATCA for a purpose, and their belief then that the United States
had a moral responsibility to uphold international law resonates today with
those who oppose amending the Act.
The ATCA debate is highly nuanced, as are the controversial judi-
cial opinions that have shaped the way courts interpret the Act. Those sup-
porting change-a strong confederation of business executives, lobbyists,
and lawyers-have tremendous influence with legislators and could ulti-
mately muster enough support to abolish the ATCA in its current form. One
ATCA plaintiff's lawyer says:
We're taking on powerful interests that have the resources and ability to
get to legislators. On the other hand, we're supported by a pretty strong
human-rights community that feels very strongly about this statute. It
would be hard for Congress to pass something like the Feinstein bill, be-
cause [it represents] such a clear anti-human rights position.8
4
And as Professor Sebok points out:
82 Kieserman, supra note 13, at 882 (citations omitted).
83 HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 15, at 3.
84 Strickland, supra note 72.
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It may be the case that the ATCA could be improved. But that is not the
job of the Supreme Court-it is the job of.. . Congress. The ATCA means
exactly what it says, and if the Bush administration doesn't like it, it
should explain to the American people-not the Supreme Court-why it
should be changed.
85
Modifying the Act might spare American corporations expensive
lawsuits and help developing nations expand their economies. But ATCA
amendments could also mean that enormous human sacrifices are made in
exchange for long-term economic progress and short-term corporate profit.
Preventing those sacrifices is worth more than the promise of faster growth.
The ATCA should continue to serve as a check on the power of formidable
corporations and as a means of upholding the United States' pledge to pro-
tect human rights around the world.
85 Sebok, supra note 39.
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